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THE COMPENSABILITY OF RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS IN EMINENT DOMAIN
RICHARD I. BRICKMAN*

In 1955 the Supreme Court of Florida decided Board of Public
Instruction of Dade County v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands.' In its
decision the Court found it necessary to choose between two rules
existing in the United States regarding the compensability of the easement created by a restrictive covenant when the land burdened with
the easement - the servient tenement - is appropriated for a public
purpose inconsistent with conditions contained in the covenant. The
Court adopted what the leading treatise on eminent domain has
2
called the minority rule and held that any diminution in the value
of the dominant tenement - the land benefited by the restrictive
covenant - was not such as required compensation under the provisions of the Florida Constitution.3 It is submitted that the equitable
easements created by restrictive covenants are valuable property interests for which owners should be compensated when they are destroyed as a consequence of a public taking. The purpose of this article is to examine the state of the law in this area, using the opinion
in Bay Harbor as a stepping stone, and to set forth what seem to be
the proper considerations that should guide the courts in future cases
in which the question is raised. It is hoped that the holding in the
case will be narrowly interpreted in the future, so as not to result
in injustice to the owners of restrictive covenants.
*A.B. 1956, LL.B. 1959, Harvard University; Member of Miami, Florida, Bar.
181 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1955).
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Throughout this article the view allowing compensation will be referred to as
the majority rule, and the view denying compensation will be called the minority
rule.

3'No private property, nor right of way shall be appropriated to the use of
corporation or individual until full compensation therefor shall first be made
to the owner .... " FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §29.
ally
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A LOOK

AT BAY HARBOR

The Town of Bay Harbor Islands is located entirely on two islands
connected by bridges to the mainland of the City of Miami. The lots
in question were subject to certain building restrictions set forth in
a restrictive covenant recorded with the plat of the town in the public
records of Dade County, Florida. The operative part of the
4
restrictions were as follows:

"'[N]o building shall be erected or constructed or maintained on any lot . . . other than residences, duplexes, apart-

ments, apartment hotels, hotels, or club hotels; no business
building may be erected on said lands or any part of said lands,
and no business may be conducted thereon .......
The Board of Public Instruction of Dade County had contracted to
purchase the lots. The contract was made with the intention of
erecting and operating a public school on the premises. The town
instituted suit to enjoin the Board from using the property in violation of the covenant. The circuit court referred the case to a master
and adopted his recommendations in a final decree which required
the Board to perform the terms of its contract but enjoined it from
erecting or operating a building for school purposes on the property.'
On appeal the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the decree in so
far as it enjoined the Board from erecting and operating a school.
At the outset of its opinion, the Court framed the problem before
it by stating two questions:6
"The first is whether the restrictions . . . which were placed

upon the subject lands at the time and which formed a part
of a general plan of subdivision of lands composing the municipality, are broad enough to prohibit the use of said lands
for school purposes and, if so, whether they may be enforced
481 So.2d at 640.
5From the record of the case in the lower court (Case No. 162445, lth Cir.)
it appears that the vendors were joined in the action by the board by the filing
of a cross bill for injunction to enjoin the vendors from selling the property.
The court provided instead that the town would hold the board harmless fol
any damages that might have incurred to the owner of the land in the event the
board did not purchase.
681 So.2d at 639.
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against the Board. The second is whether such restrictions constitute property in those in whose favor such restrictions exist
for which compensation must be made in the event said lands
are acquired for public purposes."
The Court then concluded, "A negative answer to the second question would obviate the necessity of answering the first question .... "
Thus the entire opinion is an examination of the second question
and a conclusion that since the restrictions do not constitute property, it follows ex necessitate that the Board cannot be prohibited
from using the land for school purposes.
The Court's conclusion that the case presents the necessity of
deciding whether building restrictions are compensable property interests is in accord with the manner in which other jurisdictions have
framed the issue in strikingly similar cases. 7 The Court then, however, reached the unnecessary conclusion that whether an injunction
can issue depends on the answer to the compensation question. In
doing this the Court was unduly "loading" the compensation question
in the direction of a negative answer. There were really two separate
questions before the Court, and the answers to both required separate
analysis, since the policies determinative of each were clearly different. 8 That this is true can be seen by posing the question conversely: Admitting that it would be against public policy to permit
an injunction to issue, is it clear that no compensation for these
interests is required by the Florida Constitution? By assuming that
the answers to the questions it posed were different sides of the same
coin, the Court was never able to examine the compensation problem in its proper perspective. Therefore, its decision adopting the
minority view may have been based upon an inaccurate assumption
as to one of the consequences of accepting the majority view.
7E.g., Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 Pac. 1080 (1950); Allen v.
City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 153 N.W. 517 (1911); Britton v. School District,
528 Mo. 1185, 44 S.W.2d 33 (1951). The lower court also stated: "[T]he only
real issue involved in the cause, is whether or not the restrictive covenant prohibiting the use of the property is applicable to the school board in its attempt

to use the same for school purposes." Id. at 18.
8For an apt illustration of a court making this separation, see Kirby v. School
Board, [1896] 1 Ch. 457, 449, in which the following statement is made: "It
follows that the school board are [sic] perfectly right in contending that an action
for an injunction ... is out of the question. If the plaintiffs can make out that
See also
they are injuriously affected, they will be entitled to compensation .
notes 57, 58 infra and accompanying text.
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The Court continued its opening discussion of the problem by
stating that the easements involved "do not fall within the category
of true easements, such as the right of passage, use, or rights of light,
The Court was attempting to indicate that, for
air, and view."
purposes of compensation in eminent domain, there may be a difference in treatment between easements created by restrictive covenants and certain "true easements." It overlooked the fact, however,
that a distinct difference in treatment for eminent domain purposes
has developed between positive easements, such as rights of passage
and use, and negative easements of light, air, and view.' 0 Extinguishment of positive easements is regarded as a taking of a property interest which requires compensation under the United States Constitution" as well as under the constitutions of states that have considered the problem. 12 Extinguishment of negative easements, however, has been regarded by some jurisdictions as not requiring compensation. 13 The Florida Supreme Court has held that interference
with a person's easement of view caused by a public improvement is
14
yet
damnum absque injuria and does not require compensation;
it has also held that the extinguishment of a positive right-of-way by
a public authority requires compensation under the Constitution."5
It would seem that a better approach to the classification of restrictive
covenants would have required an analysis of the reasoning behind
981 So.2d at 640.
lOThe term positive easement indicates affirmative use of land, while negative
connotes a right or power to restrict someone else's use of land. See 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §§8.11-.12 (Casner ed. 1952).
"LSee United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
"2E.g., Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890); In re Public
Beach, 269 N.Y. 64, 199 N.E. 5 (1935); see 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §5.72, n.91
(3 ed. 1950).
"3E.g., Johnson v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 187 Md. 454, 50
A.2d 918 (1947); United States Gypsum Co. v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329
Mass. 130, 106 N.E. 2d 677 (1952); In re Soldier's and Sailor's Memorial Bridge,
308 Pa. 487, 162 At. 309 (1932). See McKeon v. New England R.R., 199 Mass.
292, 295, 85 N.E. 475, 476 (1908): "At common law the petitioners would have
no remedy for any damages caused to their property through interference with
light and air and prospect by the erection by the defendants of retaining walls upon
their own land."
14Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1956); Bowden v. City of
Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So. 394 (1906); Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla.
558, 10 So.457 (1891); Dorman v. City of Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 538 (1869).
'5Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Duval County, 114 Fla. 254, 154 So. 331 (1934). See also
City of Jacksonville v. Shaffer, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932).
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this difference in the treatment of positive and negative easements.1 ,
This is especially true because restrictive covenants possess the characteristics of both and therefore should be classified separately.
In holding that under the Florida Constitution no compensation
was required for owners of land benefited by the restrictive covenant, the Court paid deference to all theories that have been advanced
in support of this view in addition to giving one of its own. These
theories will be mentioned here but will be discussed more fully
later.
First, it would be against public policy to restrict or limit the
public authority in the exercise of the power of eminent domain by
private agreements made with respect to the land.- The second reason is that the state constitution requires compensation only for the
taking of property. Since restrictive covenants are merely contract
rights, they do not fall within the constitutional protection.1s The
Court indicated approval of this argument by adopting the view of
a Georgia case, Anderson v. Lynch.1 9 Third, to require interests
created by restrictive covenants to be condemned in the same manner
as all other property in an eminent domain proceeding would create
undue procedural and substantive burdens. The Court felt that it
would be procedurally unfeasible to require condemnation suits
against all the owners of lands benefited by the restrictive covenant.
Many of the courts adopting the minority view have made reference
to the burdensome nature of such a suit.20 Furthermore, the condemning authority might be required to pay excessive compensation
in the event that many lots were benefited by the particular restriction. By this view, compensating all dominant tenement owners
would prevent the public authority from proceeding with the proposed activity.
16The Florida Court relied on another court, which also failed to recognize that
not all true easements are treated alike in eminent domain. See Moses v. Hazen,
69 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
17E.g., United States v. Certain Lands, 112 Fed. 622 (D.R.I. 1899), aff'd sub
nom. Wharton v. United States, 153 Fed. 876 (Ist Cir. 1907); Doan v. Cleveland
Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 (1915); City of Houston v. Wynne,
279 S.W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
IsMoses v. Hazen, supra note 16; Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288
Pac. 1080 (1980); Sackett v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 118 Cal. App. 254, 5

P.2d 28 (1931).
19188 Ga. 154, 160, 3 S.E.2d 85, 89 (1989), in which the court could not
"escape the conclusion that the plaintiffs have no property interest in the lot .... "
2OSee cases cited notes 23, 24 infra; City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916
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The Court, in adopting a fourth reason for its decision, applied
the concept of consequential damages. The theory is that whenever
there is a public taking of land, one of the consequences may be
that neighboring land is decreased in value. Depending on the language of the state constitution involved, the courts have split as to
whether compensation is required. 21 Until the application of this
theory in Bay Harbor,however, courts in the United States confined
the concept to cases in which there was no claim that an express
easement was being taken.
EASEMENTS IN GENERAL

PositiveEasements
It is the unanimous rule that when a positive easement is extinguished by a public acquisition of land, the owners of the dominant
tenements are entitled to compensation. 22 This rule has been followed when the easement itself is the subject of the taking and
condemnation proceedings have been brought directly against the
owner of the easements, 23 and when the servient tenement is devoted
to a public use that destroys or impairs the beneficial enjoyment
of the easement.2 4 In the latter case, it has been held that the owner
of the dominant tenement is a necessary party to the condemnation
proceedings.2 5 United States v. Welch 26 established the right to compensation under the fifth amendment to the United States Consti27
tution, and it has been the guide to state court decisions.
With respect to the measure of compensation, there has been no
problem when the easement itself was the subject of the public
taking. It has been held that its fair market value is the proper

(Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
2lSee 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §6.4432(1),(2)
cited therein.
22
See notes 14, 15 supra and accompanying text.

(3d ed. 1950). and cases

23E.g., Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Duval County, 114 Fla. 254, 154 So. 331 (1934); City

of Jacksonville v. Shaffer, 107 Fla. 367, 144 So. 888 (1932).
24Munn v. City of Boston, 183 Mass. 421, 67 N.E. 312 (1903); Hyman v. Ann
Arbor R.R., 141 Mich. 84, 104 N.W. 375 (1905); Neff v. Pennsylvania R.R., 202
Pa. 371, 51 At. 1038 (1902).
25City of Lewistown v. Brinton, 41 Idaho 317, 239 Pac. 738 (1925).
26217 U.S. 333 (1910).
27See 2 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §5,72, n.91 (3d ed. 1950).
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measure of loss.28 Some question, however, has arisen when the
servient land was the subject of the public taking. One approach,
suggested by Lewis, 29 is that the value of the servient tenement be
determined by the jury and apportioned between the dominant and
servient tenement owners. Although this may be proper when different
interests in the land acquired are the result of mortgages 30 or leases, 1'
it has not been adopted with regard to positive easements. The
accepted view is that the value of the easement must be determined
by reference to the value of the dominant estate before and after
the taking of the servient estate.3 2 The philosophy behind this rule
33
of compensation has been stated by the United States Supreme Court:
"Such compensation [as is required by the fifth amendment]
means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. The owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not
been taken."
Although the question has not arisen in Florida in the context of a
taking of servient land, the Supreme Court probably will adopt this
rule in view of its holding in City of Jacksonville v. Shaffer, in which
it held that "the constitutional right to compensation for property
taken by eminent domain under Section 29 of Article XVI of the
Constitution of the State of Florida is the full and perfect equivalent
of the right taken." 34
2

sCases cited note 23 supra.

29"When there are different interests or estates in the property, the proper
course is to ascertain the entire compensation as though the property belonged to
one person and then apportion this sum among the different parties according
to their respective rights. The value of the property cannot be enhanced by any
distribution of the title or estate among different persons or by any contract

arrangements among the owners of different interests. Whatever advantage is secured to one interest must be taken from another, and the sum of all the parts
cannot exceed the whole." 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN §716 (3d ed. 1909).
3OSee Annot., 58 A.L.R. 1534, 1546 (1929).

31See Raleigh Operating Co. v. Naglo Corp., 3 Fla. Supp. 111 (1953); Sowers
v. Schaeffer, 152 Ohio St. 65, 87 N.E.2d 257 (1949); MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 79, §24

(1921).
32United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910); Boston Chamber of Commerce
v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910); In re West Tenth Street, 267 N.Y. 212, 196
N.E. 30 (1935); Neff v. Pennsylvania R.R., 202 Pa. 371, 51 At. 1038 (1902).
33United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1942).
34107 Fla. 367, 374, 144 So. 888, 891 (1932).
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154

Negative Easements Not Created by Express Covenant
The easements that fall under this category stem from the common law doctrine of ancient lights. If over a period of twenty years
there was no construction on land adjoining that of the owner of
certain realty, the owner acquired an implied easement of light, air,
and view over the vacant land; and the dominant owner could
restrain the servient owner from using his land in a manner that
interfered with this easement.8 5 This doctrine has been expressly
repudiated in the United States for the purpose of a private suit
by one landowner against a neighbor.16 Some courts have retained the
doctrine, however, in the context of eminent domain and have held
that compensation must be awarded to the owner whose easement
Thus, when a public authority erects a struchas been destroyed.ture that interferes with the light, air, and view of a landowner, these
courts will award compensation.3 In these jurisdictions the measure
of compensation is the value of the easement taken. 39
Florida, however, has expressly repudiated the doctrine of implied negative easements for all purposes. The Supreme Court has
consistently denied compensation for the taking of this type of easement when erection of a public structure on or above a public high40
In
way has destroyed the abutting owner's implied easement.
right
that
an
owner's
Court
stated
the
Beach
County,
Weir v. Palm
to light and view over a public highway is "subordinate to the underlying right of the public to enjoy the public way to its fullest extent
as well as the right of the public to have the way improved to meet
the demands of public convenience and necessity."4I The Court went
on to hold that the loss of an easement of light, air, or view is noncompensable. It should be noted that this holding is contrary to the

35Sce

I Am. JUR., Adjoining Landowners §49 (1936).

36Ibid.; see cases n.20.
37See 2 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §596 (1939).

38E.g., Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d
605 (1949); see State ex rel. State Road Comnm'n v. Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120
P.2d 276 (1941); Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465, 252 Pac. 111 (1927).

3'E.g., Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Single v. State, 186
Misc. 452, 59 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Ct. Cl. 1946), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 665, 76 N.E.2d 326 (1946).
40E.g., Bowden v. City of Jacksonville, 52 Fla. 216, 42 So. 394 (1906); Selden
v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891); Dorman v. City of Jacksonville, 13 Fla. 538 (1869).

4185 So.2d 865, 869 (Fla. 1956).
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weight of authority; 42 however, for purposes of this article, the soundness of the position taken by the Florida Court with respect to these
types of negative easements can be assumed.
In summary, then, the situation in Florida before the Bay Harbor
decision was that the courts drew a sharp line dividing those easements
that were compensable when extinguished by a public taking and
those that were not, with the division made between express positive
easements of use and implied negative easements, which only restrict use.
Classificationof Restrictive Covenants
It is necessary to examine the nature of restrictive covenants so
as to decide whether the easements to which they give rise should be
regarded as positive, negative, or in a class by themselves to which
an entirely different set of principles should be applied. The origin
of these easements was essentially contractual in nature. In the English case of Tulk v. Moxhay43 it was stated that when the grantee of
one parcel of land agrees that the land will be used only in a certain
manner, a court of equity will enforce the covenant against all
subsequent owners of the land who have acquired it with notice
of the covenant. This was the first step in the development of the
concept that the person for whose benefit the covenant was made acquires some type of property interest in the land subjected to the
covenant.
Today, instead of describing the restrictions on the use of land
in every deed, so that the restrictions take the form of a covenant
from each particular grantee, the common grantor, usually the developer of a subdivision, records a plat or a separate instrument dedaring the restriction to be placed upon each lot of the subdivision.
Each deed to a lot then incorporates by reference the recorded restrictions, and they appear in the chain of title. This difference in
the form of the creation of the covenants, however, has not vitiated
their validity and enforceability, since the principles of Tulk v. Moxhay have been accepted and followed in all jurisdictions in the
United States. 44 Each lot in the subdivision is therefore restricted
as to its use in the manner described in the recorded instrument, and
42See 2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §5.72 (3d ed. 1950).
432 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).

44See 2

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§9.24 (Casner ed. 1952).
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these restrictions can be enforced by injunction by the owner of any
lot. The Florida Supreme Court has consistently upheld the validity
of this practice and has enforced restrictions similar in character to
45
those in Bay Harbor.
Perhaps the most accurate description of the easement created in
46
the manner outlined above appears in Sanborn v. McLean:
"It runs with the land sold by virtue of express fastening and
abides with the land retained until loosened by expiration
of its period of service or by events working its destruction.
It is not personal to owners but operative upon use of the
land by any owner having actual or constructive notice thereof.
It is an easement passing its benefits and carrying its obligations
to all purchasers of land subject to its affirmative mandates."
A restrictive covenant creates an easement that is to a large extent
identical with an express grant of a positive easement. Just as a
positive easement is created by the deed of the owner of the possessory
interest in land, this easement is created either by deed or by some
other legal instrument and incorporated by reference. 47 The recording of a deed of a positive easement makes it binding upon all subsequent owners of the servient estate in favor of the owners of the
dominant estate; 48 the recordation of these restrictions imposes upon
all subsequent owners the burden of compliance that is enforceable
by the other landowners in the subdivision. It is equally as apparent,
however, that restrictive covenants possess the major characteristic of
implied negative easements - the nature of the right created does not
allow affirmative use of the servient tenement by the owner of the
dominant tenement; it is only a power to prevent certain uses by the
servient tenement owner.
The foregoing analysis is of little significance in a jurisdiction
45E.g., Vetzel v. Brown, 86 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1956); Ballinger v. Smith, 54 So.2d
433 (Fla. 1951); Heisler v. Marceau, 95 Fla. 135, 116 So. 447 (1928).
46233 Mich. 227, 230, 206 N.W. 496, 497 (1925). See also Sprague v. Kimball,
213 Mass. 380, 382, 100 N.E. 622, 624 (1913): "It is not a covenant running with
the land at law, but it is an equitable easement or servitude passing with a conveyance of the premises to subsequent grantees . . . . While only the mode of use
is regulated and the fee passed, yet the estate is encumbered with the inherent
restrictions which create an equitable, enforceable interest."
47See CASNER & LEACH, CASES ON PROPERTY 1133-35 (1951).
4SSee Buffalo Academy v. Boehm Bros., Inc., 267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935);
Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299 (1931).
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that grants compensation to the owners of both positive and implied
negative easements for extinguishment by a public authority. But
Florida has not adopted such a liberal construction of the state constitution. Thus, when the courts of the state deny compensation
with respect to certain types of easements and grant it with respect
to others, it becomes of great importance to classify restrictive covenants. The question then becomes whether to create a new category
and apply a new set of principles to the easements falling therein,
or to try to "squeeze" these easements into one of the two existing
categories.
It is submitted that the former approach is the sounder one.
Restrictive covenants possess the characteristics of both positive and
implied negative easements. Thus the compensation principles applicable to either of these categories alone are not adequate with
respect to restrictive covenants. Furthermore, it is not sensible to
have an across-the-board rule that would require the same result in
49
all circumstances.
A better approach would be to recognize that restrictive covenants are distinct legal entities and should be treated as such. Analytically, they fall somewhere between positive easements on the one
hand and implied negative easements on the other. For this reason,
principles that should guide a court faced with a question of compensability should be flexible. Before discussing the relevant considerations and policies that should shape these principles, however,
it is necessary to examine the state of the law as it exists today in
the United States and England.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

The Majority Rule
The doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay was established in 1848; yet it
was not until 1896 that the question of the validity of restrictive
covenants arose in the context of a public body's use of servient land in
a manner inconsistent with the restrictions imposed upon it. The
49This is especially true when it is recognized that restrictive covenants are
peculiarly the creatures of equity. Whereas it may be appropriate that rigid
rules of law govern legal easements, it is altogether inappropriate and against
the nature of courts of equity for the decision in one case to lay down an immutable principle for all subsequent cases. See CHAFFEE & RE, SELECrONS FROM
CASEs AND MATERIALS ON EQurry 956-58 (1958).
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case in which the question was first presented was almost identical
in its fact situation to Bay Harbor. In Kirby v. School Board0 the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the local school board from erecting a
school on land adjoining his property. The board had purchased the
land with notice of a restrictive covenant. The court denied the
plaintiff injunctive relief, but all of the judges agreed that he was
entitled to compensation for breach of the restrictive covenant.5
The view expressed here was promptly adopted in a case involving the erection of railroad tracks by the defendant in violation
of a covenant--of which the defendant had notice- restricting the
use of the land to dwelling houses of a minimum value.52 The
plaintiff instituted a proceeding for compensation under section 68
of the Land Clauses Consolidation Act and did not seek an injunction.
The sheriff's jury awarded the plaintiff a sizable verdict, and this was
53
affirmed, the court stating:
"Then we come to the real point in the case -whether a
breach of a restrictive covenant is the subject of compensation
....
In point of principle, I cannot see why it should not be
It is a matter of common sense that when by covenant,
....
by an easement being attached, or in any other way, the value
of the land is enhanced, and the railway company substract
[sic] a portion of the value by making their railway, they are
injuriously affecting the land."
These two English cases indicated that while it is improper to
allow restrictive covenants to be directly enforced by way of a permanent injunction against the use of land for public purposes, it is
also improper to leave the owner of the dominant tenement remediless. Legislation requiring compensation to those injured by a public
taking of land struck a nice balance between the conflicting interests
of the injured landowner on the one hand and the public needs on
the other. These courts further recognized that restrictive covenants
SOL.R. 1 Ch. 437 (1896).
51The three opinions in the case expressed the view that the provisions of

the Land Clauses Consolidation Act clearly applied to the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff through the loss of his negative easement, but that compensation was
available notwithstanding the fact that his remedy by way of injunction had been
destroyed by the act.
52Long Eaton Recreation Grounds Co. v. Midland Ry., [1902] 2 K.B. 574.
53d. at 581.
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are as valuable an interest in land as the more obvious types of legal
interests.
This same judicial attitude carried over to the United States and
appeared in some early opinions in which the question was raised.
The difference was that instead of statutes attempting to strike a
balance there appeared in the constitutions of all the states-and
that of the United States -provisions to the effect that private
property shall not be taken for a public use unless compensation is
fully made to the owner. The courts thus had a statement of policy
in the form of a constitutional demand, not as a mere statutory
5
direction. 4
The first American jurisdiction to pass precisely on the question
was Michigan in Allen v. Detroit.55 The Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed an order enjoining the city from erecting a fire engine house
on land contiguous to that of the plaintiff. What was enjoined, however, was not the erection of a fire engine house per se but rather
the doing of this act without first compensating the owners of interests
in the property for their resultant losses. The public interest was
not permanently thwarted by a court injunction, as the interests of a
private owner would have been had he sought to use the land
in violation of the restrictive covenant. Rather, the public interest
was merely subordinated to a constitutional protection extended
the individual in the form of a requirement for compensation. 56
The distinction between the English and the American views
stems from the pragmatic difference that arises when a statutory
rather than a constitutional mandate is implemented. It is logical
that the English statute, which specifically provides for obtaining an
award of compensation when there is an acquisition of land by a
public body, should be held to destroy any remedy by way of injunction that an injured person might have. Such a statute permits
the public body to engage in its activity without being hampered by
private suits for injunction and sets up a system by which valid interests in the land acquired can be compensated. In the United States,
where the courts must look to a constitutional provision which is
stated in very broad terms and which provides no specific machinery
for obtaining the required compensation, it seems no less logical that
.4Three early American cases which answered the question in the negative
will be discussed infra.
55167 Mich. 464, 13 N.W. 317 (1911).
The Michigan court reaffirmed this position in
50MIcH. CONsr. art. XIII, §1.
Johnstone v. Detroit, G. H. 8- M. Ry., 245 Mich. 65, 222 NAV. 325 (1928).
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the courts should enter an injunction until the required condemnation
procedure is complied with. Under both circumstances, however,
the point bears repeating that there is no desire by the courts to
stifle the public interest by way of a permanent injunction against
the public activity.
The clearest expressions of this injunction-compensation distincleading jurisdiction are found in observations by the courts of two
57
tions. The New York Court of Appeals has said:
"The public service corporation, exercising the right of eminent
domain, has the advantage over the private person or corporation in that it cannot be kept off the premises entirely, but may
enter the restricted district and destroy its exclusive character
upon making just compensation for property rights thus taken."
And in Connecticut the Supreme Court has stated:5 s
"The private owner may not violate the restriction; if he attempts to do so, he may be restrained by injunction. The
governmental agency may not be restrained from making such
use of the property as the public purpose for which it is acquired may require, but, if that involves the taking of private
property, it must make compensation for the same."
It is this distinction that the Florida Supreme Court failed to
make in Bay Harbor. Instead, it concluded that the answer to the
question whether an injunction should issue depends upon whether
restrictive covenants are compensable.59 Had the Court recognized
that there were two competing policies to be weighed, it would not
have framed the issues as it did. It should not have considered the
restrictive covenants as a carte blanche prohibition of the erection
of a public activity, nor should it have approached the injunction
question in its broadest sense. It would have been possible for the
57Flynn v. New York, W. & B. Ry., 218 N.Y. 140, 146, 112 N.E. 913, 914 (1916).
(Emphasis added.)
58STown of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 367, 143 At. 245, 249 (1928).
(Emphasis added.)
59"Having reached the conclusion we have, it becomes unnecessary for us to

pursue the first question further except to observe that the answer we have given
to the second question necessarily determines that the restrictions may not be
enforced against the Board." 81 So.2d at 644.
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Court to hold that the chancellor, in the exercise of his discretion,
could withhold the broad relief sought by the plaintiff and confine
0
its remedy to an injunction until compensation was granted.6
The most recent expression of the majority rule was stated just
two years before the question arose in Bay Harbor. The Virginia
Supreme Court decided that the erection by a defendant power company of high voltage transmission towers, in violation of a restrictive
covenant benefiting the plaintiff's land, could be enjoined until it
complied with the constitutional requirement of compensation. The
court stated: "Injunction is the proper remedy to prevent the taking
or damaging of private property for a public use without just compensation by one who is invested with the power of eminent domain.","
The Minority Rule
The assertion was made earlier that the first American jurisdiction
to give a precise holding on the compensability of restrictive covenants was Michigan in the year 1911. A case adopting what has come
to be the minority rule was decided in 1899, however. In United
States v. Certain Lands62 the federal government had condemned
land for the purpose of locating fortifications for coastal defense. The
lots were part of a subdivision that also included the claimant's lot;
however, no part of his land was actually taken. All of the lots in
the subdivision were subject to a restriction that prevented the construction of any buildings for the operation of certain noxious, dangerous, or offensive trades. The claimant in his petition for relief
sought compensation for the destruction of his right to restrict the
use of the lands taken, alleging that the destruction of his negative
easement constituted a taking of property for which compensation
was required under the terms of the fifth amendment. The court
denied his claim, and this denial was affirmed on appeal.
The basis of the decision was that the proposed governmental defense fortification was not the type of undesirable structure prohibited
by the building restrictions, and hence there was no violation of the
coSee note 49 supra.
aiMeagher v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 146, 77 S.E.2d 461, 466
(1953). See also City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 235 N.C. 671, 71 S.E.2d 396 (1952).
62112 Fed. 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1899), aff'd sub noma. Wharton v. United States, 153
Fed. 876 (1st Cir. 1907).
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covenant. The first inquiry made by the court was into the nature of
63
the governmental activity. The opinion stated:
"[TIhe right acquired by the government does not appear to
be in any substantial particular inconsistent with the provisions
of this condition, or destructive thereof, and that for this reason
there is no taking of the claimants' property in this particular."
The court then considered whether, if there were a violation of the
covenant, compensation would be required under the fifth amendment. The statements that followed were not essential to the decision. On appeal the holding was affirmed on the ground that the
use by the United States was not "inconsistent with the conditions of
the deed or destructive thereof." 64 The case has been so far expanded,
however, that its actual holding has been obliterated, and it now is
regarded as standing for the statements made as obiter dicta - that
it would be against public policy to allow restrictions on building
to prevent governmental activity and that rights created by restrictive
covenants are merely contract rights and not property within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. United States v. Certain Lands, as
an interpretation of the United States Constitution by two federal
courts, has been followed by the courts of at least seven other jurisdictions. 65 It is surprising that these courts were willing to accept
as "good law" statements that were essentially dicta. This may somewhat explain the reason that this is a minority view.66
This view was illustrated by the Florida Court in Bay Harbor.
The different theories that support the minority position were not
discussed as separate arguments, however, but were interwoven to
formulate a general expression that compensation should be denied.
Nevertheless, for purposes of analysis, it seems preferable to treat
each theory separately.
63112 Fed. at 627.
61153 Fed. at 877. For an analysis of these two federal cases, see Johnstone v.

Detroit, G.H. & M. Ry., 245 Mich. 65, 71, 222 N.W. 325, 327 (1928).
6SMoses v. Hazen, 69 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Friesen v. Glendale, 209 Cal.
524, 288 Pac. 1080 (1930); Sackett v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 118 Cal. App.
254, 5 P.2d 23 (1931); Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85 (1939); Doan
v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., infra note 67; City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W.
916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); State ex rel. Wells v. City of Dunbar, 142 W. Va. 332,
95 S.E.2d 457 (1956).

cSee 26
VA.

FORDHAM

L.

REV.

130 (1957); 59 W. VA. L.

REV.

391 (1957); 36 W.

L.Q. 363 (1930).
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PublicPolicy
The public policy argument is based upon the theory that the
right of eminent domain rests upon public necessity, and that any
attempt to allow restrictive covenants to inhibit the actions of the
sovereign or one of its lawfully created agencies would be void. The
first case to give effect to this idea relied heavily upon Certain Lands.
In Doan v. Cleveland Short Line R.R.6T the suit was against a railroad for damages caused by the construction of tracks over land
burdened with a restrictive covenant. Although there was no attempt
on the part of the plaintiff to prevent the railroad's operations, the
court reacted as if there were. It cited Certain Lands to the effect
that such an application of restrictive covenants would be illegal and
void. This was unnecessary, since all that was sought was a money
judgment for the damage caused the plaintiff -not an injunction
against the railroad. The companion case to Doan was a suit brought
to enjoin a railroad from constructing tracks until compensation was
made. 68 The court held that what was said in Doan applied a
fortiori in a suit for injunction, since here the attempt to inhibit
sovereign action was blatant. With these two opinions, Ohio became
the first state to endorse the minority view.69
The public policy argument was most recently expressed in a
West Virginia case, 70 with one significant modification. The court
specifically confined its statements to the application of restrictive
covenants to a taking by the government and made it dear that its
decision might be different in the case of a taking by a public service
corporation."1 Whether the court was implying that a different rule
might apply to the latter category remains to be seen. At least there
is some indication in this 1956 case that the minority rule may be
given a narrower effect in the future.
The basic weakness in the public policy argument lies in the mistaken assumption that upholding the validity of restrictive covenants
necessarily will prevent the furtherance of essential public activity.
This weakness is what has been referred to previously as the inability

0792 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 (1915).
sWard v. Cleveland Ry., 92 Ohio St. 471, 112 N.E. 507 (1915).
o9Ohio has subsequently approved the minority view in Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Gale, 119 Ohio St. 110, 162 N.E. 385, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 571 (1928).
7O0State ex rel. Wells v. City of Dunbar, 142 W. Va. 332, 95 S.E.2d 457 (1956).
72See 59 W. VA. L. REv. 391 (1957).
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of the courts to make the compensation-injunction distinction. One
7
majority rule court has described it as follows: 2

"The fallacy of the argument lies in the assumption of its
minor premise that the requirement that the State compensate the owner of the dominant tenement for the taking of his
interest in the servient tenement actually interferes with the
exercise of any governmental function."
As soon as it is recognized that the requirement of compensation
commanded by the state and federal constitutions might be said to
be an interference with any governmental taking-be it of a restrictive covenant or of land itself - the basic structure of the public
policy argument collapses. The constitutional requirement of compensation to owners of land taken by eminent domain is obviously not
an undue interference with a public activity. Yet if the policy argument is a valid one, it must apply with equal force in this situation.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has said that "no
private property shall be appropriated to public uses unless a full
' 3
and exact equivalent for it be returned to the owner."
Restrictive Covenants As ContractRights
The minority rule courts have realized this potential anomaly
and have sought to buttress their position by characterizing restrictive covenants as not "property" within the meaning of the Constitution. They label restrictive covenants mere contract rights, which
are never compensated when destroyed by a taking in eminent domain.
There is a type of contract interest that the United States Supreme
Court has held does not fall under the protection of the fifth amendment. The Court has drawn a distinction, however, and has refused
to say that all types of interests created by contract are not compensable. In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States74 the plaintiff's
contract with a steel company was broken by virtue of the fact that
the United States had requisitioned the entire output of the company.
The plaintiff sought to compel compensation under the fifth amend72Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 367, 143 AtI. 245, 249 (1928).

73Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
74261 U.S. 502 (1923).
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ment in a suit in the Court of Claims, claiming that its right of
priority to a certain amount of steel was appropriated for a public
use. A demurrer to the petition was sustained, and this decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court recognized that this was
property within the meaning of the Constitution, but held that on
the facts no property was taken and hence no compensation was required. In InternationalPaper Co. v. United States75 a power company authorized to divert 10,000 cubic feet per second of water from
a power canal had conveyed by lease the right to divert 730 cubic
feet per second to the plaintiff. When the company was directed to
transmit to the United States all of the electrical output that the
plant was capable of producing, the water being diverted to the
plaintiff had to be utilized. The plaintiff's suit for compensation in
the Court of Claims was dismissed; but this time the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the fifth amendment required compensation.
The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court is incapable of precise description. Nevertheless, it is substantial enough for its elements
to be recognized. When the contract right destroyed has no connection with a corporeal interest in land, no compensation is required;
but when the right destroyed, though created by contract, is in the
nature of an estate in land, the fifth amendment requires compensation. In view of these expressions by the Court, compensation should
not be denied when a restrictive covenant is destroyed by a taking in
eminent domain. Their validity for purposes other than eminent
domain, manifested by the universal acceptance of Tulk v. Moxhay
and their classification as negative easements running with the land,
inidicates that these contract created rights are within the category
of interests that require compensation.-6
The analogy to the treatment of contract rights by the United
States Supreme Court does not seem to have been made in relation
to compensability of restrictive covenants. Its effect, therefore, on a
court predisposed to adopt the minority view is uncertain. However,
in view of the tenuous justification which these courts have drawn
from the contract-property distinction, the analogy might be enough
to tip the judicial scales in the direction of compensation. Constitu75282 U.S. 399 (1931).
761n fact, it would seem that an interest in the nature of an easement over
land is a stronger case for compensation than a right to water power, in view of
the recent decision in United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956),
in which the type of property interest in the water of a navigable river was

strictly limited.
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tional guarantees ought not to depend upon a label without regard to
77
the underlying character of the subject matter involved.
Undue Proceduraland Substantive Burdens
The minority rule jurisdictions have adopted a third theory in
support of their position. Essentially, it is a two-pronged argument
that unwarranted procedural and substantive burdens would be imposed on the public authority if the taking of restrictive covenants
required compensation. It seems appropriate to deal with each
"prong" of the argument separately.
The substantive aspect of this argument is that the over-all
amount of damages would be so great as to make it impossible to
acquire lands in a large subdivision for public use. The procedural
aspect can best be seen by the following remarks made in the first
case to suggest this idea:78
"Appellees' contention, if carried to its extreme, is that, if
there was an addition to the city in which there were 10,000
lots, the city would be required to serve the owner or owners
of each lot in a suit to condemn any one of such lots for public purposes. Such contention, if established as the law governing such matters, would be practically to prohibit the city from
condemning property so situated for public use .... "
This is a grossly exaggerated situation which would rarely, if ever,
occur,7 9 but there are several answers to the basic premise.
In other situations in which a large number of persons may be
affected by a judicial proceeding, legislative and judicial wisdom has
not been stymied. In the administration of a decedent's estate, when
the rights of unknown creditors of the decedent must be adjudicated,
the problem of serving notice to numerous claimants has been overcome through the use of notice by publication.80 In suits to quiet
title to land, a similar approach has been used. 81 These are not
77See

Aigler, Measure of Compensation for Extinguishment of Easement by

Condemnation, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 5, 15.
7SCity of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
79See Note, 55 MicH. L. REV. 877, n.6 (1957).
8oSee FLA. STAT. §§733.15-.16 (1959).
SiSee FLA. STAT. §48.01 (1959). Moreover, id. §73.04 permits service of process
by publication in condemnation proceedings.
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exactly similar situations, since when land is involved almost all of
the lot owners can be ascertained from the public records; therefore,
actual notice of a condemnation suit can be served upon them. Nevertheless, it would seem feasible to adopt a system of notification by
publication, at least with respect to those owners whose lots are geographically remote from those actually acquired by the public authority82 If such a system were in force, the objection that a 10,000lot subdivision situation would present an impasse to the public
use would be eliminated.
Another approach would be to consider the loss of a restrictive
covenant as similar to the landlord-tenant and mortgagor-mortgagee
situations. Thus the condemnation suit would need to join only the
owner of the land taken.8 3 The apportionment of the award among
the dominant tenement owners would be accomplished by separate
suits against the servient owner. Although this would solve the
problem of the 10,000-lot situation, it is thought undesirable, since
it necessarily would require a measure of damages that in all likelihood would prove inadequate.84
A third answer is also the reply to the substantive aspect of this
argument. Even if there were 10,000 lots burdened with certain
building restrictions, the public taking of any one for an inconsistent
use would not result in the destruction of the negative easements in
s2Such a system could be fitted into the present Florida statutory framework
by either of two methods. The first would require a modification of FLA. STAT.
§73.01 (1959) to the effect that the petition for condemnation name as parties
defendant the lot owners adjacent to the lot sought to be acquired. In view of
the provision in §73.21 which permits joinder of as many defendants in one cause
of action as the circumstances will permit, this would not seem to be an unreasonable modification. Since §73.04 already prescribes a method of notice by publication to achieve constructive service on defendants who cannot be served personnally,
the more remote lot owners in the subdivision could be served pursuant thereto.
The second method would require no modification of the present statute, since
the provisions of §73.05, which provides for intervention in the condemnation
suit by any person not expressly made a party who claims an interest in the
property sought to be acquired, could be utilized by all the owners of the dominant tenements. Under both these methods, a modification of the present statute
relating to the costs of the condemnation proceedings might be desirable. See
notes 87-89 infra and accompanying text. The former method seems preferable,
since it would manifest an express legislative intention to award compensation to
the holders of restrictive covenants in the appropriate cases, and would seem
to be more consistent with the provisions of the Florida Constitution.
S3Fuller v. Town Board, 193 Wis. 549, 552, 214 N.W. 324, 325 (1927).
s4See Notes 100, 101 infra and accompanying text.
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favor of the other 9,999 lot owners. Only those lots either adjacent
or in close proximity to the one taken would suffer any injury. As one
writer has put it: "As the distance of the claimant's lot from the
invaded tract increased, the amount of compensation would rapidly
diminish soon to the vanishing point."85 What may be a substantial
injury to an adjacent lot owner might actually benefit more remote
lot owners in the subdivision, since the location of a school therein
would be an advantage to the neighborhood as a whole.8- There are
also many types of public takings that cause little or no damage and
that may even benefit the adjacent lots - for example, land taken
for the purpose of establishing a non-recreational park or constructing a roadway divided by ornamental trees.
Probably those persons who would have to receive notice of the
condemnation proceedings would be few in number and those who
would seek to intervene after being informed of the proceedings by
way of a statutory notice by publication would also be relatively few.
Chances of recovery would be slight, since each intervenor would
have to prove his case. The number of people could be further reduced by a modification of the present statute regarding costs in a
condemnation proceeding. 87 It is suggested that a method of assessing
a portion of the cost of the proceedings to claimants whose damage
was determined to be negligible would accomplish this. Such a
statutory scheme now exists in several states in connection with stockholder derivative suits against a corporation.-S Under these statutes
the plaintiffs are required to post security for the expenses incurred
by the corporation in the defense of such suits. If the court determines that the claim is a frivolous one, it is within the court's
discretion to allow the corporation its expenses out of the security.
The major import of such statutes is their deterrent effect upon
strike or nuisance suits. By analogy, the number of parties claiming
compensation for the destruction of a restrictive covenant would
be limited to those who were willing to post security for costs., 9
85Aigler, supra note 77, at 32.
86See 36 W. VA. L.Q. 363 (1930).
87FLA. STAT. §73.16 (1959) provides that the public authority shall pay all the

costs of the condemnation proceedings.
88See FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §6045 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1959).
89The suggested statute should provide for a minimum sum to be posted as
security for the additional costs of the condemnation proceedings. It should also

provide that, upon application by the condemning authority, the security could
be applied to defray the expenses if the court should determine that the claim
was without merit.
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ConsequentialDamages
The fourth theory relied upon by the Court in Bay Harbor dealt
with consequential damages. Before this decision the theory had
generally been applied to a situation in which the damage was not
to property actually taken by the public authority but only to
neighboring land. 90 Not even the courts in minority rule jurisdictions
have applied consequential damages to the destruction of the negative easement created by a restrictive covenant. These courts have
recognized that, though they denied compensation, some sort of
interest was abrogated. Since the theory has been applied only when
no legally recognizable interest was destroyed, it would be unwise
to extend it to this class of injury. Moreover, the term consequential
damages is unsatisfactory even when no such interest is taken, since
it is inherently ambiguous. Nichols states: "The use of the term introduces an equivocation which is fatal to any hope of a clear settlement."9' Thus, when the Florida Court said, "It is a well recognized
rule that damages may not be recovered because of the depreciation
in value of nearby property which may result by the construction of
a public building in the vicinity,"92 it was looking to a theory which
theretofore had been limited to situations of quite a different nature
from the case before it.
The most convincing reason why this theory should not apply to
the taking of restrictive covenants was given in Flynn v. New York,
W. & B. R.R.: "These restrictive covenants create a property right and
make direct and compensational the damages which otherwise would
be consequential and noncompensational. ' 3 The theory of consequential damages has no place in a situation in which a legally recognizable interest is taken. It is suggested that the Florida Court
should not have relied upon such an ambiguous concept- especially
in view of the fact that it has recognized that restrictive covenants are
enforceable in private actions. 9- Consistent with its holdings that
consequential injuries are noncompensable,95 the Court could have
adopted the reasoning quoted above and held that the restrictive covenants made the injuries direct.
9oSee 2 Nxcnors,

EMINENT DOMAIN

§6.4432 (3d ed. 1950).

911d. at 338.
9281 So.2d at 642.

93218 N.Y. 140, 146, 112 N.E. 913, 914 (1916).
94See cases cited note 45 supra.

05See cases cited note 14 supra.
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SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

In both the majority and minority rule jurisdictions the problem
has been approached as though it required an absolute answer that
would be the "law" for future cases. No court has ever been willing
to adopt a flexible rule which would allow compensation in certain
cases and deny it in others, depending on the facts of the particular
case.
The consequences of this "black or white" approach in the majority rule jurisdictions are not serious, since the jury can limit the
amount of compensation required and thus a certain amount of
flexibility can be attained. In the minority rule jurisdictions, where
no discretion can exist, at least three anomalous results have appeared. First, some courts avoid the question of compensation altogether by finding that the particular covenant was not violated
by the public authority even though the express terms of the covenant prohibited an identical use by a private person. 6 The West
Virginia case of State ex rel Wells v. City of Dunbar97 illustrates the
second anomaly, since the court indicated that the minority rule would
be applied to governmental bodies but not necessarily to public
service corporations. In this situation, the dominant tenement owner
would find himself in the curious position of having a compensable
interest if his negative easement were taken by a railroad, but not
if it were taken by a school district. The third anomaly is exemplified
by a recent Colorado case 98 in which the court denied a petition for
intervention in a condemnation proceeding and adopted the minority rule. The unfortunate aspect of the court's flat adoption of
the rule is that on the facts of the case no court, even in a majority
rule jurisdiction, would have granted the claimants relief, since it
was apparent that the mutual restrictions were created after they
had notice that there would soon be a suit to condemn land in the
subdivision. The restrictions were obviously made in bad faith; 99 yet
the court's adoption of the rule would make it applicable to good
faith claimants as well.
Since easements created by restrictive covenants possess the characteristics of both positive and implied negative easements, they should
9See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §9.40 (Casner ed. 1952).
97142 W. Va. 332, 95 S.E.2d 457 (1956).
9sSmith v. Clifton Sanitation Dist., 134 Colo. 116, 300 P.2d 548 (1956).
99See 26 FOPrDAM L. REV. 130 (1957).
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be treated as distinct legal entities. The courts should look to the
particular use to which the land is to be put by the public authority
in the light of the language of the particular restriction and base
their holdings primarily upon the individual facts of the cases before
them. In extreme cases the decision should be relatively simple.
For example, if a garbage incinerator were to be erected on land
restricted to residences, a court should have little trouble in deciding
that at least the adjoining lot owners would lose a valuable easement.
On the other hand, when the public taking is for the location of a
beautification project, such as a public garden, a divided roadway, or
the like, no court would be apt to conclude that any easement was
destroyed, notwithstanding the fact that the words of a particular
restriction were violated. The more difficult cases would have to be
decided by a jury in condemnation proceedings, and the claimant
would have to prove that an actual decline in the value of his land
was caused by the violation of the restrictive covenant.
With respect to the measure of damages, the suggestion of Professor Aigler,1°° which is the rule adopted by most of the majority
rule courts, seems to be the most sensible. This rule looks to the
value of the dominant tenement before and after the taking. Another approach looks to the market value of the servient tenement
at the time of the taking. Only two jurisdictions- have adopted
the latter view, since it contemplates an award that can be no greater
than the value of the servient land. It fails to take account of the
fact that the total loss to the dominant tenement owners could conceivably be much greater than the amount of compensation awarded
to the servient tenement owner. For example, if an incinerator were
erected on an open lot adjoining several valuable residences, this
method would obviously be incapable of producing a just award.
Professor Aigler's approach seems more consistent with the purpose
of the constitutional requirements of compensation.
The flexibility to be gained by such judicial treatment of restrictive covenants would not sacrifice the principle, emphasized by
the Court in Bay Harbor, that public policy requires that no essential public activity may be permanently enjoined at the instance
of a private landowner. This approach would achieve the proper
M

00Aigler, supra note 77 (passim).
IOlHerr v. Board of Education, 82 N.J.L. 610, 83 At. 173 (1912); Hayes v.
Waverly & P.R.R., 51 NJ. Eq. 345, 27 AtI. 648 (1893); Fuller v. Town Board, 193
Wis. 549, 214 N.W. 824 (1927).
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balance which the constitutional requirement of compensation for
the taking of property interests seeks to attain. It would allow the
court to give proper weight to the interests of the injured property
owner on the one hand, and to the interests of the public on the
other, in maintaining that amount of public activity essential in a
rapidly developing society. The judiciary alone, however, cannot
accomplish this desired end. Legislation is necessary to establish an
effective method of notice by publication to all the persons who may
be affected by a particular taking. This legislation would also have
to take into consideration the appropriate safeguards that may be
necessary to limit the number of potential claimants to those with
meritorious claims.1o2
CONCLUSION

The Florida Court was correct in refusing to grant a permanent
injunction in the Bay Harbor case, but was improvident in its choice
of authorities. Thus the law regarding the question of compensation
in eminent domain can result in serious injustice to the owners of
restrictive covenants. To remedy this, two steps are suggested: (1)
legislation to establish an appropriate procedural system for condemnation suits in cases in which restrictive covenants may be
destroyed, and (2) a judicial interpretation of Bay Harbor to the
effect that the rule denying compensation is to be applied only when
the facts show no damage to the holders of the restrictive covenants
and not as a rule of law determinative of the outcome of every subsequent case in which the question arises.

1o2See

text at note 88 supra.
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